
Sell-off or silver lining? Why Africa’s carbon deals need a decision system
13 November 2026
Africa earns real money selling carbon credits abroad. But every tonne sold is a tonne it can no longer count towards its own climate targets. Most countries have no system for deciding what to sell and what to keep, so deals collapse and credibility suffers. Genesis helps governments decide…
Article 6 of the Paris Agreement lets countries sell mitigation outcomes - emission reductions or removals - to foreign governments, airlines and companies. With the first credits under the agreement's own mechanism issued this year, more African governments now have this option.
But they face a choice: Every tonne a country authorises for sale abroad is a tonne it can no longer count towards its own climate target. Many countries are putting carbon market frameworks in place. To sell well, they also need a decision system that tells them, each year, which tonnes to sell and which to keep. Early deals show what goes wrong without one - and our work with governments across Africa shows why.
What goes wrong without a decision system
Africa's early carbon deals show what happens when countries decide case by case, without settled rules or transparent frameworks. In Kenya, a company collapsed even though nobody was wrong.
Kenya's laws set out who authorises what, but not how much can be sold. KOKO Networks, a bioethanol cooking company serving up to 1.5 million households, sought authorisation to sell credits abroad. The government declined: a cabinet secretary said the project would have used Kenya's entire international share. That was a legitimate call to protect its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC), its climate target under the Paris Agreement. The company later collapsed into administration for reasons that remain debated.
When nobody can see the limit in advance, every large request becomes a late, all-or-nothing decision. Kenya's 2026 guide now caps authorisations at 10 million tonnes of CO₂ equivalent for 2025 to 2030, reviewed every two years. Investors can price a low ceiling. They cannot price an invisible one.
Integrity failures in the voluntary market predate Article 6, but they carry over once a government authorises tonnes. Verra found that more than half the credits from Zimbabwe's Kariba REDD+ project were issued in excess. In northern Kenya, a court found that two conservancies in a carbon project were set up unconstitutionally, and Verra suspended the project. A sale built on contested land can unravel after authorisation, taking the country's credibility with it.
Our findings show challenges start inside government
Our work with governments shows these cases are structural gaps in Article 6 readiness. They stem from three gaps a decision system must close.
The first is that nobody adds up the national total. In consultations with sector ministries on red and white lists - white lists naming activities whose mitigation outcomes may be sold, red lists reserving activities for the national target- one official argues a programme needs money and buyers have it, so it belongs on the white list. The next ministry does the same.
This is not irrational: ministries answer for their own programmes, and none owns the national total. Overselling rarely comes from one bad decision but from many good ones nobody adds up. The cost compounds: every tonne sold must be replaced at home, and buyers prefer proven tonnes, so the easiest tonnes to sell are often the ones to keep. Land-use measures, for example, attract strong buyer interest but are also expected to deliver many unconditional NDCs. Without clear rules to manage this tension, the sum arrives all at once - just as it did in Kenya.
The second gap is knowing what the country owns. Many NDCs set targets in aggregate, not action by action. Under Article 6, a government must know the tonnes each intervention will deliver and at what cost, set against its target and against where developers are exploring crediting. An early step is a living catalogue of likely projects by sector and scale; directional estimates, refined each year, are enough to start.
The third gap is measurement, and it cuts both ways. If a project cuts 50,000 tonnes and all are sold abroad, the country adds 50,000 tonnes back to its accounts. If its inventory, built on default emission factors, recorded only 10,000 tonnes of the cut, the country ends up 40,000 tonnes worse off on paper. In a resource-constrained environment, the sensible approach is to upgrade the inventory first in the sectors with the most crediting potential.
A decision system turns these lessons into routine decisions
A framework sets the rules; a decision system tells a government how to apply them each year. It rests on four capabilities: a catalogue of what each intervention will deliver, the cost of each tonne, near-real-time tracking against the target and a view of buyers and market dynamics. With these in place, the tools for managing sales become settings rather than one-off choices.
Lists signal priorities, case-by-case review handles activities that fit neither list, buffers hold back a share of each project's tonnes and fees fund the replacement of tonnes sold. Each is adjusted as the room to sell changes, reviewed on the national planning cycle and applied only to new projects. None of this needs to be perfect before a country trades, but a vision is needed.
Buyers reward countries that are ready. In September 2025, the International Air Transport Association estimated that airlines need 146 to 236 million units eligible under CORSIA, the aviation offsetting scheme, for 2024 to 2026. Yet because host governments have been slow to set clear rules, only about 40 million fully authorised units are available. CORSIA accepts only credits backed by a Letter of Authorisation and a corresponding adjustment, in which the host country deducts the tonnes from its own accounts so the buyer can claim them. Countries with clear, predictable pathways to authorisation gain a first-mover advantage in a supply-starved compliance market.
Building the system is a shared task. Governments must take the decisions and invest their political capital; development partners can fund the work behind them.
So, what should governments do?
Take the decisions that unlock the rest: Approve the framework, name an authorising body that can work at buyers' pace and choose a registry host.
Know what you own: Tag each NDC intervention with expected tonnes, cost and conditionality, and keep a living pipeline tracking progress from planning to reporting.
Assign clear roles, including a mandate to decide which tonnes stay at home.
Build the capacity and tools - lists, caps, buffers and fees - to set and update allocation policy regularly.
Settle the groundwork before the first deal: community rights, benefit-sharing, use of revenue and clear criteria for choosing partners.
What development partners should do
Fund the government's roadmap, pooled and multi-year, not separate studies from separate partners.
Fund decision systems: The catalogue, tonne costing, priority inventory upgrades and near-real-time tracking, so each authorisation reflects current information.
Invest in regional public goods, such as shared emission factors and a common approach to the climate benefit of cross-border electricity across the Southern African Development Community.
The cautionary tales were failures of system, not of intent. Africa can capture far more value if its sellers are as well equipped as the buyers they face. The countries that do best will be those that know, every year, which tonnes to keep.
Genesis works with African governments to design carbon market frameworks and the decision systems behind them. We would welcome a conversation. You can reach out to Raul Fernandez, Sarah Wewege, John Ward and Keith Coleman here: bdu@genesis-analytics.com